The Transcendental Argument for God

TAG or the Transcendental Argument for God, is typically an argument that is widely misunderstood from certain people thinking it just fallaciously asserts that God exists because God exists, or we even have highly respected philosophers such as Graham Oppy who in a video on YouTube where he "addresses presuppositional apologetics" he thought it was an argument that one must have absolute proof or certainty about everything from the external world to mathematics. If you just go on Reddit and search for pressuppotionalism or Christianity, you will see exactly what I mean. Both sides of this debate care more about appearing to be correct or smart, rather than what is true. In this article I wish to attempt to show why I think my position is true, and bring the level of debate to a higher level.

So what is the argument exactly? the argument, as I will present it as an argument about the comparison of paradigms rather than the classical arguments were some try to start with either empirical evidence or rational arguments, and reason from there to the existence of God. For example, Aquinas and his famous "five ways" are exactly this. I will attempt to argue at a more foundational level, one in which supposed evidences are put to the side and the paradigms in which they are interpreted is put into question. My first argument will attempt to deductively conclude the necessity of a specific epistemic starting point or bedrock, which will be a certain type of entity in which knowledge is grounded, which I will call theonomous epistemology, which I will explain Later, as opposed to the contrary position, which I will also explain later. After the first is established what will follow is an abductive argument in which we compare different metaphysics, and I will argue that it will lead us to conclude the Christian metaphysic which I will put forth, but that will be an argument for another time which I will not cover in this article.

I will first outline how I will come to my conclusion by putting forth two different syllogisms. The first will be a disjunctive syllogism.

P1, Either autonomous epistemology or theonomous epistemology

P2, Not autonomous epistemology

Conclusion, Therefore theonomous epistemology

I will later explain premise 1 of the argument, as well as defending premise 2, which is what the entire argument hinges upon.

My second argument will establish the second premise in the previous argument. I will put it in a multi-premise syllogism following the standard rule of inference for multi-premise syllogisms.

P1, The existence of knowledge is first order, the proposition that "knowledge exists" is second order

P2, The autonomous theory of knowledge is epistemically committed to first order knowledge

P3, Any commitment or affirmation of first order knowledge is itself a second order knowledge claim

P4, but one cannot epistemically start with first order because in the mode of committing or affirming one is making a second order knowledge claim

P5, The second order is itself a knowledge claim

Conclusion, Therefore, the first and second order knowledge are affirmed or committed to simultaneously which is logical circularity since if we think about it syllogistically P1 would be the second order and the conclusion would be the first order, but both are the same knowledge commitments or claims therefore it would be a closed system of logical circularity or mere tautology

I will defend each of the premises and show how each follow from the next. Then finally I will further demonstrate the conclusion and what it establishes and why it is devastating and insurmountable for the autonomous theory of knowledge. I will not cover every single objection to my argument, but I will cover the most apparent and common.

First to define the terms of first and second order knowledge, in order to avoid misunderstanding. First order knowledge can be defined as "S knows P." Second order knowledge can be defined as "S knows that S knows P." Further to clarify, the argument is not about first and second order claims in general rather it is about first and second order knowledge claims about knowledge itself. Those two are not the same category and should not be confused with each other.

Now, what do I mean by epistemic commitments or affirmations? I do not mean it in the sense of a verbal statement or proposition what I mean rather is a nonverbal or possibly verbal but not necessarily, commitment to first order knowledge in this context. I can't think of a category or term to accurately describe this off the top of my head. So, I will just say non linguistic.

All theories of knowledge are committed to first-order knowledge if one denies it then they are in a performative contradiction since in the act of denying first order knowledge one is making a knowledge claim. Now, some might object to my usage of knowledge in the syllogism by saying that, what and how knowledge is and functions is different in and in between the different theories of knowledge, but this objection makes an error in assessing the argument put forth. It mistakes my argument as a whole epistemic critique of a paradigm when the argument actually is a critique of an epistemic starting point or first principle. For example you can critique the whole epistemology of foundationalism, or critique the epistemic starting point of rationalism. By clarifying this I'm able to use a basic definition knowledge which is justified true belief without importing external or alien concepts or commitments, that a theory of knowledge that I am critiquing may not hold too, since if I did that then the argument is no longer an internal critique, rather it would be an external critique. By doing what I proposed I can make the same arguments that philosophers make when critiquing different epistemic first principles. Such as when philosophers make critiques of empiricism by taking the basic principles of that theory of knowledge, and use a basic notion of knowledge in order to critique it, since one does not need to account for all the differences in epistemologies that hold to empiricism, in order to make an internal critique. For example Willard Quine in his famous paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," he critiqued empiricism, but not the entire theory of knowledge that could be built around it.

Now let's explore the definition of knowledge. The definition of knowledge is justified, true belief. So, one cannot have knowledge if they are not justified. Because it would just be a wild guess. One cannot have knowledge if it is not true. Because it would just be a false belief. One, can also not have knowledge if they don't hold a belief about something. This is a basic notion of knowledge, I understand there are Gettier problems when it comes to knowledge. But for the sake of the argument, I will not dive into those. First, what does it mean for something to be justified? There are different theories as to how something is justified. For example, you have the foundationalist, the coherentist, and the pragmatist, which all have different theories as to how something is justified in different ways. Is it possible to have a neutral definition? I would say yes, in one sense and in another no. We can work with a neutral definition of warranted belief or good reasons to believe something in a general sense but obviously different theories will see what this means in different ways differ in a specific sense. So, this is why I also said no, because how and what constitutes justification will not function the same but does this mean I can not use a standard definition of justification, or that I will always be importing external concepts to an internal critique? I would argue no to that, but with qualification. I still think the basic idea of justification, which is warranted belief, doesn't import or smuggle external concepts, but here is where the qualification comes. If my opponent insists, or I see it fit, I can use this argument in a specific or targeted sense or approach, as supposed to the less specific, general sense, used earlier, which would require the argument to critique the theory justification on its own grounds, which means that it would have to update this definition in a specific sense to avoid making an external critique of a paradigm as opposed to the intended internal critique. But this doesn't change or invalidate the argument, it just means I have to use terms more specifically.

Now, what does it mean for something to be true? There are obviously different theories as to this. You have correspondence theory of truth, divine command, and even forms of inter-subjective theories of truth. Giving a definition to what truth is seems very difficult on its face. Since by trying to define it by its counterpart seems to beg the question as to what it even is, since it only gives a vague assertion to what it is not. I think that using a definition like "Truth is that which corresponds with reality" is actually the closest thing we have to a neutral definition. I know it sounds like I am using the definition of the correspondence theory of truth to the exclusion of the others. But my reasoning is this. That definition is actually not one that is strictly correspondence, even though some would agree with that internal to that theory of truth. But the correspondence theorist has other entailments and commitments when it comes to truth past this basic definition. Such as what is reality, and what criteria do we use to determine what corresponds and what doesn't, as well as other epistemological commitments. But this definition works fine if we examine what is meant by it how the different worldviews can accept it, and how it doesn't import any external concepts. What it means for something to be true is that it accurately and correctly matches up with something in reality or correctly, describes it. The proposition that "rocks are hard" is a true statement since it comports with her sense of feeling. But the proposition that "the sky is orange" is a false proposition because it doesn't comport with our sense of perception about reality. Now, I know there are ways to quibble with these statements I just made. But for the sake of argument, I will move past these and just use those as examples. To an extent, I would argue that all, or at least most theories of truth can agree with this, to the extent of what I can think of right now. Since this theory intertwines with one's metaphysic, because reality is a metaphysical claim, there will be differences. But internal to one's paradigm, I don't see how it is even possible to say there can be a true statement that doesn't at least correspond to reality in a bare sense. For example, an atheist is committed to a naturalistic (or at least most of the time) metaphysic where in, God does not exist in a classical sense. So, the statement that "God exists" would be a false statement because according to them, God does not exist, therefore that statement does not comport with reality. A critique could then be raised that the correspondence principle that "truth is is that which corresponds with reality" does not itself correspond with reality or is analytically true. While I do think this is a good argument against a correspondence theorist. I do not think it works as an argument against me in the way I'm using it, as a general concept or principle. Since all I have to do is justify that it is a universally or at least a somewhat generally applicable concept, and doesn't necessitate me using external concepts or commitments in an internal critique, not that it is true or workable internal to a specific theory of knowledge. Now, does this important external or alien concepts, to my internal critique? I would say no, with some qualification. Because the principle does carry along with it, the concept of "reality" which is controversial. But in the sense, I am using the principal, It doesn't necessitate a single theory as to what reality is. This part of my work, is just my own speculation, and is subject to revision if research proves my intuition incorrect.

Finally, the last component of what constitutes knowledge is basic belief. Which just means to believe or to hold something or some proposition to be true. For the sake of argument, I do not wish to go into philosophy of mind or sort out the different ways in which "belief" is interpreted and used, for the sake of argument I will just use a basic definition. I think this is straightforward, even though there might be some slight differences, I don't see the need to flush it out. So, I will just work with the basic neutral definition. Which is the one put forth just now.

This was the bulk of the work I had to do in the arguments, in order to flush out how and why I'm I am not importing external or alien concepts into an internal critique, which would obviously make it invalid. Now with that out of the way, I can now continue.

I now wish to address what I mean by "Epistemic first principles or Foundations." A basic definition, for this is the underived principles or self evident axioms by which all other knowledge is grounded and built upon. I understand that this type of language sounds like the epistemology of foundationalism. But with the sense in which I am using it in, I simply mean how does one start their epistemology and with what assumptions. Does one start with the foundation or ground of God or of man's unaided reasoning?

Some might object to my argument by saying that at the foundation of all world views are either circular, self-evident, or regress infinitely. This is often times called Agrippa's Trilemma. This objection to my argument seems rather ridiculous, Since it just ignores everything that I am arguing in this article. First, I don't think it is even possible in principal, let alone in practice, for a worldview, to never terminate, and regress infinitely. Since, how is it even conceivable to have an actual infinite amount of both epistemic and metaphysical grounds, in which one level is justified by something further and on for infinity. This isn't even conceivable to start with. Secondly it seems this approach has a problem with justification itself. It seems to me that if one member of the chain is not justified in virtue of itself, as the bedrock. Then in what sense is the whole of the chain justified? It seems to never answer that question and just pass the justification buck further and further down the line without ever answering the question, of how it is even justified. Now when it comes to foundations of epistemology and metaphysics, the other two options, according to the trilemma, is either circularity, thus being a bedrock foundation, or self-evident axioms, which is also a type of Bedrock foundation. Think of somebody like Aristotle, for anyone who has read his book on Metaphysics. Both seems to be similar in the sense of being themselves a foundation of a world view. Now, the problem with using this as an objection to my argument, is that it just proves what I am arguing for. Since not all supposed to "foundations" are the same, or in the same privilege position. Because it would be incoherent for you to even argue that position. To demonstrate that let's say that there were two hypothetical worldviews. One view has the metaphysical ground or foundation as a divine mind. The second has their foundation as a piece of toast. Which is supposed to be what all of what reality fundamental is and what constitutes it. The former has a respectable position the latter is laughed at for being a ridiculous position. This shows how not all worldviews are the same or whether or not you can have foundations. But, rather if your worldview can even give an account of knowledge, metaphysics and ethics.

Now, with the terms and definitions out of the way, I can move past the needless debating over terms, and I can get into the concepts themselves before I move on to defending the arguments put forth. I would like to clear up two concepts before moving on. First, whether or not, there is a difference between autonomous and theonmous epistemology, and how they differ in starting point. Second, whether or not my argument, implicitly relies on the KK principal. The answer to the first is yes. There is a difference between the two epistemic starting points or first principles. To show this, first let's define what autonomous epistemology even is. It is the foundational assumption that man starts with his own knowledge or concept of it without any other ground or aid. For example, an empiricist will start with the peripatetic axiom as the epistemic first principle. Which is defined as "nothing is in the intellect that isn't first in sense data." this can be qualified or changed by some philosophers, for example, Lebinz had his own clarification of this. Now this does not mean that God does not exist or cannot exist. For them it is just means that God could or could not exist, but man has to find out for himself either through experience, rational arguments, or wagering with themselves. Now this is obviously a way over simplification, and much more could be said, but for the sake of the argument, I will just leave it brief. This position also goes along with natural theology, which I have critique in the past and still have critiques of. Then the contrary position to this is what I call the theistic or theonomous epistemology, which has the foundation of a certain type of entity, that being what we call God, which is in a privileged epistemic position as a personal knower itself. Not only that, but also the metaphysical ground of reality, in which all reality is a field of consciousness/ideas, final causes and purposes are real, and knowledge and laws of logic/mathematics are contained. But that gets into metaphysics, which is a topic for another time. For now, I wish to show this entity is in an epistemically privileged position as an infinite knower, and that it avoids the insurmountable and devastating epistemic problems. The country position has which I would argue, and I will later on, that a certain type of entity is not only sufficient to ground knowledge, but actually necessary. I will establish that claim later on. For now, I wish to flush out this position. First, we should not think of it as a bottom-up epistemology. Rather, it should be thought of as top-down. What do I mean by this? I mean that rather than starting with the assumption of establishing our own first order knowledge, then constructing our worldview from there. We start with the external knower that grounds knowledge and justifies it, and this knower grants or imparts knowledge to us. So, that knowledge is a innate in us, but we are not the grounds of it. Rather in an eternal, universal, and immutable and infinite, knower is. This external knower needs not to establish knowledge, but rather it is knowledge itself, being one in the same in reality for all of eternity. This right here, is how we avoid the problems of epistemology that I outlined earlier in my argument. An objection can be raised that there is an explanatory gap between this ground of knowledge, which is God and us in our mind. I must now appeal to my metaphysics in order to explain that there is no metaphysical explanatory gap. I will start with my theory of ontology, which is a field ontology. Which means that God, which is consciousness or pure mind itself, is the field or ground of all reality and that we exist as ideas or perceptions in the mind of God and we are dissociations in this field. So that all of our reality is exactly what we perceive, and it exist not as mind independent physical "stuff" but exist as ideas. This is a form of subjective idealism. So in respect to substance us and God only differ in degree not in kind. What this means now is that I do not have an explanatory gap in my epistemology, since what constitutes us, that being dissociative boundaries in the field of ontology, is us being ideas or perception than the mind of God, which is a kind of causal explanation. Before moving on in the argument, I would like to mention that the form of Christian Idealism which I put forth is not essential to the argument. Rather it is apart of the metaphysical I currently hold to, and argue for, but I am willing to change my position, so it is subject to change. So, in short the theory of metaphysics I put forth is just an extra addition to it, rather than essential. Now other objection could be raised, "cool story, but how do we know that to be true and why ought we to believe it?" To know requires justification, not just basic belief. To know that something is true Propositionally is more difficult to establish. I propose we can know it to be true through transcendental deduction, which would show it to necessarily follow if the if the premises are true. Now to explain the first part of what I said. The theory of knowledge I put forth I will describe as a theistic foundationalism, which I would say is different and distinct from the classical foundationalism in which, as I explained earlier, it is top-down rather than bottom-up. So, the foundation of God in this theory of knowledge would be justified by way of appeal to the entire system or epistemology I put forth. This is similar to what the philosopher Alvin plantiga argued for, and we both argue that in the Christian worldview God is taken as either properly basic or foundational. I prefer to say foundational rather than just self-evident. Because I think the notion of self-evident truths or axioms is problematic. Since it lacks a criterium to distinguish the self evident ones from the non self-evident axioms, plus it lacks sufficient grounding for why we should even accept the notion of self evident truths itself. Overall this means that God is not directly argued for in the sense of arguing for something like 2+2=4. Rather, I would look at justification more holistically internal to the theory of knowledge. Then the question might be raised, how can we know that the move I just made is it so true or justified? Since at this point, I'm not making any exclusive claims, all I need to do is ground the claim I just made. Which just means to give good reasons for something to be true. I would appeal now to the coherence and workability of the principal I put forth as warrant for belief, now with that out of the way I can deal with other objections. How do we know the epistemic starting point or foundation I chose to be true? I propose earlier we can know through transcendental deduction. What I mean by that, is we can show that a certain type of entity to ground knowledge necessarily exist. I will use a biconditional argument to show this.

P1, X if and only if Y

P2, Y

C, Therefore X

In this argument, "X" stands for "God or a certain type of entity," and "Y" stands for knowledge. If the first premise is true, then the conclusion necessarily follows since it follows the rule of inference for a biconditional syllogism. How do I establish the first premise to be true? By the argument I put forth earlier in which I attempt to transcendentaly deduce God as the necessary ground of knowledge. Now the question might arise, how do we know God is not lying or giving us false knowledge? This seems to be a more trivial objection, rather than a serious one. But I do think it is important to address, since the arguments strikes at exactly what I am arguing for. Since I am arguing knowledge is not created or establish autonomously, but rather is grounded in God and imparted to us as an ideas or concepts. I will get into the last part of what I stated later, for now I will deal with the objection present. We can know by way of disjunctive argument.

P1, either God is or is not lying/Deceiving

P2, God can not lie or deceive

C, therefore God is not lying/deceiving

I would argue that this is a strict either-or, since this is contingent upon the nature of God. He cannot be half lying or half tricking us, because even a half illusion would still be contrary to his nature. Now, how do I establish the second premise in the argument? By way of reason. I'll take the classical argument or reasoning from effects to their cause with the argument of causality. They're two types of causal chains, hierarchical and linear. The former is like a lamp held up by a table, then the table was held up by the ground. This happens all at the same time. The latter is akin to a series of events happening through time. For the hierarchical, causality is only possible if one member is the "bedrock" or an unmoved mover. Because even if the causal chain is infinitely long, then causality still is not intrinsic to the chain unless the chain terminates in something that is purely actual or uncaused. This chain can't terminate in the world, because the world is acted upon since it is an orbit around the sun, and it undergoes change it itself. It can't be the universe itself for the same reason. Now, where does this terminate? It must be something not changed or purely actual, but it is itself the changer of everything else or the actualizer of everything else. Because if not, then we have the same problem that I showed with the Earth and universe. Now if it is unchanged, then it must be perfectly good, if not, then it will lack something, and if it lack something, then there is something it can become, thus undermining immutability. Now I do not wish to sort out all the counterarguments or exhaustively layout this argument. If you want that, then you can go read Ed Feser or Thomas Aquinas. But for now I just wanted to establish God as perfectly good. So, now it follows that a perfectly good God would not do something contrary to his nature, such as tricking or Deception. Another objection could be raised to this as to how I know God isn't tricking or manipulating my reasoning and causing it to come to the previous conclusion? The simple answer is that this assumes that logical deductions do not necessarily follow. Because I haven't already shown how the argument does follow necessarily. All the question does is just refrain the first objection, which has already been addressed. Another counter argument could be made, "how does the Theistic epistemology avoid the problems of affirmation of first order knowledge previously raise?" The theonomous epistemology avoids such problems because there is no parallel between the two positions. One posits knowledge as identical to an entity, which is invariant and infinite, and it is an us an innately. The other worldviews either establish knowledge or abstract it from the natural order. Therefore, as I said, there is no parallel. Now in what sense is knowledge and innate in us? Since we have direct access to God, by way of us being ideas or perceptions in the mind of God, which is subjective idealism, which I promote, but for the sake of argument, I will not exhaustively lay out the full case, but I can elsewhere. Since us and God are both the same single substance, that being ideas or consciousness. Though we still differ in degree even though and kind we are the same in substance. Though we are in a sense created and God is uncreated. But for the sake of time, I won't go into this. Just for the sake of argument, I will appeal to my metaphysics, but will keep it brief for the sake of time. So, how should we think of learning into what extent do we innately have knowledge? learning is just a form or use of cognition in which we discover what is already present in our minds. I have no answer to what the extent of our knowledge could possibly be, for I don't think that this is an answerable question by its own nature. Now I have showed that the autonomous and theistic foundationalist theory of knowledge are different from each other in the sense of epistemic starting point and showed it doesn't fall to the same problems of the autonomous epistemology, though there is more to be said about my position and other objections that could be raised, I won't get to them, because they are outside the scope of my argument. The last objection, I will answer before getting to how the premises and conclusion follow and what conclusion establishes, will be the objection that "if all autonomous epistemology destroys the the possibility of even having or accounting for knowledge, then how do unbelievers have knowledge in this world and in a possible world where God does not exist, is knowledge actually unattainable?" To answer the former, "unbelievers" don't have second order belief or knowledge of God, but they have first order belief. What this means that they believe in in their heart that God exists but ignore it and suppress it with their mind and actions. As Romans 1:19-21 states. Plus all men has some connection to God, since all we are is dissociations is in the field of consciousness, that being God. The answer to the latter is that I first do not grant the hypothetical, for the reason of God being ontologically necessary. Secondly, if I do grant the hypothetical, then I would say yes, knowledge would be impossible to obtain in that possible world. Now onto the syllogism itself. In the argument, do I rely on the KK principle? I would say I do not because what the KK principle is, is that if you know a proposition, you must know that you know (second order). I reject this principle and I would argue I don't use it. Because my argument is not a semantic argument, rather it is epistemological. Therefore, I am not forcing statements to self reflect on themselves or force people to accept that in order to know something, you must know that you know. Rather the epistemic topic I am arguing about is precisely targeted at knowledge itself and the affirmation of it. As I previously explained. Since "knowledge exists" is first order and the proposition "knowledge exists" is second order. Due to the nature and level of the affirmations I am discussing the.

Now onto the syllogisms that I previously put forth. First, I used a disjunctive syllogism. In which I set up the either – or of theistic epistemology or autonomous epistemology. One must be one or the other. Any foundational levels, such as what I set up, there are only two choices for the bedrock ground of knowledge itself. Either got exist necessarily, and he is the ground knowledge itself. Or God does not exist, or God could possibly exist, and knowledge as establishing accounted for timely. This is a comparison, a paradigm in which one must be sound, and the other one is not. The way I would think of establishing God's existence is by the way of paradigm level arguments since it doesn't make sense to argue from some empirical or rational evidence to God since one must interpret these arguments through their paradigm. Which will dictate how they see the arguments and whether or not they follow. Because the idea of neutral evidence seems to beg the question as to how. Since the people arguing about the supposed neutral evidence are not neutral in the sense of paradise. But this is a tangent for another time. All that is necessary for me to do right now is to show there is only two choices for your epistemology. Theistic or non-theistic ground or knowledge. I see no other "third way" to go. Since if you don't ground knowledge in man or in God. Then where else can you ground it? Now some might argue you don't have to ground knowledge, and knowledge is just knowledge, there is no rhyme or reason or justification as it what and how it is. But this response to my argument merely makes a bare assertion which is unfounded. For what reason to we have to think it to be true? Plus if we don't give an account of our knowledge, then to say we possess it would just beg the question. Because we could just think we do, or it could be illusory. In other words, nothing about having "knowledge" or using reason demonstrates that knowledge exists, since the former is a psychological assertion and the later is an epistemic and I see no necessary connection between the two. If we resort to mere assertions and psychological reporting, then we have given up debating and reason all together. I wish to avoid that, unlike people such as Matt Dillahunty who just wish to assert arguments are not convincing or persuasive, and call it a day.

Since the disjunctive syllogism is a standard logical syllogism, I won't need to defend it too much. All I have to do is defend the second premise and the conclusion necessarily follows. But now that I have established the two epistemic starting points in question. I can proceed.

The second argument I put forth, which was the multi-premise argument, following the standard rules of inference for multi-premise arguments, in which the reason and purpose was to establish the second premise of the previous disjunctive argument. Which was "Not autonomous epistemology." Let's examine each premise and I will show why each premise follows all the way to the conclusion, and finally I will explain the conclusion and respond to the final criticisms of my argument, even though up to this point I have already clear up most of the objections.

I will not repost the syllogism, I will just leave it at the top of this article and I will reference it here. The first premise should not be controversial. I already explained my reasoning and defines the terms I am using and in what sense I am using them. Plus, the arguments about it being merely semantics I cleared up earlier by explaining what I meant by "to affirm."

Then follows the next premise, that piggy backs off of the first, and also makes an uncontroversial statement. I also previously mentioned that to deny this premise seems to put you into a contradiction. Because if you reject first order knowledge. Then you are in a contradiction because in order to reject knowledge you must make a knowledge claim. Such as, "knowledge does not exist." Or "I know that knowledge does not exist." Which are both knowledge claims.

So, now moving the third premise. This is where it might get more controversial and where push back begins. Since some might object that to affirm or commit to first order knowledge does not imply a second order affirmation. Plus they might argue that this implicitly relies on the KK principle. But that argument I already addressed, and showed how I am not using it. But that this is a specific case in epistemology where a first order claim is reflective and makes it second order. Which is not ad hoc as showed since, "knowledge exists" and the proposition "knowledge exists" are first and second order respectively, but in the affirmation of the first, the second is made. I wish language wasn't so limited, because it is hard to communicate ideas such as these through language and I am doing the best I can. In my head this is so much simpler than having to try to explain it with words. Now back to the argument. I would argue the objection to my argument that "to affirm or commit to first order knowledge does not imply a second order affirmation," is ill founded and rather arbitrary as an assertion. Since it doesn't seem to actually carry with it any philosophical weight, rather it seems more reactionary. But I will still address it. While it is true that in normal linguistics, to affirm "A" does not necessarily entail "B." I totally grant that and think it to be true. For example if I say I like oranges, that doesn't necessitate me also liking apples. The analogy here isn't perfect but it is simple and demonstrates the point. But this argument also gets bogged down in linguistics when my argument isn't about that. It is about first and second order knowledge claims themselves. Which are two different things. I have noticed that a lot of people think my argument is linguistic, either implicitly by what they say, or explicitly. Which is why I chose to clear that up earlier in this article. To summarize, the proposition "knowledge exists" is second order. Thus in affirming first order knowledge, one makes a second order knowledge claim.

Now to the fourth, this shouldn't be controversial either, given what I have previously said in the last paragraph as well as earlier in the article. Given the third premise to be true, which is previously demonstrated, this premise follows. I would say it is just a restating of what was established in the previous premise. I can't think of any objections to this. Besides somebody saying that the second order knowledge claim is only previous to first order knowledge, because of the way of affirmation. Since you can affirm something before another without it being necessarily being prior. For example you can affirm the effect before you affirm the cause, that doesn't necessitate the effect being prior to the cause. This objection also makes the mistake of thinking my argument is linguistic. Which I can understand since I am using words to express my thoughts. But that doesn't mean the argument is about linguistics. So, since my argument isn't linguistics, rather it is epistemic. So, now the objection put forth doesn't follow. Because the second order knowledge claim is prior epistemically to the first order because the former affirms and commits to the latter. Thus epistemically it is prior.

Now the fifth premise. This shouldn't be controversial either. It merely states the second order knowledge claim is itself a knowledge claim. Which is true. The only way I am thinking somebody could object is by saying that it is not itself a knowledge claim. Rather it is a linguistic statement that uses the concept of knowledge. I am not quite sure what "concept of knowledge," is supposed to mean. That seems vague, but even if I grant this statement to be true it doesn't touch my argument. Because as I have previously stated many times this argument is not about linguistics. Rather it is about epistemic order.

Now with the premises explained and defended. What conclusion follows? I would argue three things follow. Which I have combined in one conclusion.

First, one can not affirm first order knowledge, because one is always making a second order knowledge claim. The second order affirmation is itself a knowledge claim. Therefore one can not move from the second to the first, because the second epistemically relies on the first.

Second, One could end up in logical circularity. By saying accepting the circularity that the first conclusion had. Thus it would follow and be something like, "Knowledge exists because knowledge exists." This is a clear example of logical circularity, since the conclusion just restates the first premise, without adding anything or providing justification. Rather it follows the form, 1 because of 2, 2 because of 1, and on for infinity in a circle.

Third, One could just accept circularity and claim it is foundational. Or take it as properly basic and thus assumed. This could be in the form of an abstract idea or brute fact. There are many ways in which this specific conclusion can go, depending on the response. Which is fine, it isn't a flaw, it is a part of the argument itself. Now, how would I go about responding? This third conclusion is likely the most common, since the position in question would likely not concede on the first two conclusions. So, almost always it will end up here. If, we are to take knowledge itself as foundational, primitive, or properly basic, then the problem of criterion will arise. What I mean by this, is that whatever somebody asserts to be foundational, let's take for example axiom "A." It will be arbitrarily asserted to be foundational, if one cannot differentiate between the non foundational principles from the foundational principles by way of epistemic criteria. In short, my response would simply just be, what is the epistemic criteria for knowing what is foundational from non foundational? Now, I see three ways this could go. First, appeal to coherentism. Second, just say axiom "A" is foundational because it is foundational and no further justification is needed. Third, give an epistemic grounding.

None of these responses work either. First the problem with coherentism, as modern philosophers have noted. Is that if one member of a set or theory is not foundational. Then it seems to make the entire structure foundational. Thus it doesn't even get off the ground, and it ends up in the problems of foundationalism. I would also like to note, that it seems to me, that coherentism doesn't even provide justification for the entire theory of knowledge itself. If the levels or members of a set are not justified by way of grounding. Then in what sense is the entire structure justified? I don't see where justification is coming from. Before somebody retorts with, "that's a composition fallacy." Remember I didn't make an argument, I was inquiring into the theory of knowledge itself, those are two different things. If it is solely justified by being coherent, that principle of justification doesn't seem to be coherent itself. Because by what standard is something coherent? Does that mean intuition? Or just not contradicting yourself? Or does it mean just don't have a ridiculous worldview? But I don't see how we could even determine what is and is not coherent. This theory of knowledge seems to be applicable without qualification, thus anything could be justified if it is supposedly coherent? Which that notion itself doesn't seem to be coherent.

Now, the second response. Just asserting that something is something without justification, seems to be arbitrary, and actually begs the question. Now I do not mean the thing in itself without qualification. I mean why something is classified as something? For example why is axiom "A" foundational? I am not asking about the thing in itself, rather I am asking about classification. Without that distinction, it seems that anything could be called foundational, if we aren't allowed to ask why. So, in short without any justification as to the why question I asked, one just simply is arbitrary, and has no warrant for the classification.

Now to the third objection. Somebody might be able to give positive arguments as to why "axiom A is foundational." But what is the nature of this grounding? Typically the way somebody would give positive reasoning for "A" being foundational is by saying nothing else is prior to it. Prior how I might ask? The problem with this response is that it pushes the question back, because we would need to know itself to be true, in order for that statement to be intelligible or meaningful, rather than simply arbitrary. Secondly it assumes that in principle there can be strictly one foundational axiom. But that doesn't seem to be even possible. Since both epistemology and metaphysics are intertwined, though not the same, worldviews are going to consist of many foundations. Such as the axioms of logic, mathematics, language, the self, external world, as well as knowledge itself as we have been discussing. So, the objection to my argument, seems to assume something that isn't even possible in principle.

I have now finished explaining my argument. I have explained and defended every premise and demonstrated the conclusion. The question might be asked, "what exactly have I shown?" I will admit that I can not provide a full refutation in the sense that I show beyond a shadow of doubt, that the position I am critiquing fails by way of some breach of logic or internal contradiction. But that standard itself is ridiculous. In philosophy you don't have to put forth an absolute refutation of a worldview in order to reject it. For example I can not provide an absolute refutation that there is an invisible sea monster that eats up ships off the coast of Florida around midnight. This is obviously absurd, but I can not provide an absolute refutation, by showing a contradiction or some other absolute refutation. But we can still reject this theory as absurd, for many reasons. So, to bring it back to my argument, I think I have demonstrated good reasons for us to reject the autonomous theory of knowledge. Therefore we are justified in affirming the second premise of my disjunctive syllogism, which was "not autonomous epistemology." Therefore my conclusion follows necessarily and we can conclude theistic epistemology.

I would like to briefly talk about what my conclusion to the disjunctive argument establishes and what it does not. My argument as I put forth, establishes theistic epistemology as both sufficient and necessary to ground knowledge. What exactly does that mean? It means that an entity to ground our knowledge is necessary. Thus how we obtain that knowledge, since it is not grounded in us, is by way of this entity's self revelation and connection to us. Now, where I differ from most "pressuppotionalist," is that I don't think the transcendental argument proves the self revelation of God, as scripture. Thus this argument doesn't conclude with, scripture is true or inspired. It only concludes the necessity of a certain type of entity. The second part of the argument will be to move from God as the necessary ground, to make the argument the Christian metaphysic is the superior metaphysic, thus through abduction, we can infer it is the best explanation. So, for the Pressuppotionalist that disagree with my conclusion can debate me, but for everybody else I hope this article presents the transcendental argument for God precisely and clearly so that we can being the level of polemics online and in person, to a higher and better level. Where both sides understand each other, rather than neither side understanding and just hurling insults at each other, like what you will see if you go on Reddit. I will conclude this article now, for anyone who disagrees feel free to respond, all of my ideas and arguments are subject to change or revision if I am convinced of something else or proven wrong. by matthew brinson